Bin Laden killed in Pakistan
Osama Bin Laden is dead. Unlike President Obama who scored a major foreign policy achievement before the election season, the Pakistani leadership is in a tough situation. It is now known that Bin Laden was found and killed in a compound in Abbottabad, near Islamabad, a garrison town of Pakistani military. Pakistani government in a statement on Ministry of Foreign affairs website welcomed the news, but highlighted the operation to be in line with“declared US policy that Osama bin Ladin will be eliminated in a direct action by the US forces, wherever found in the world.” and stressed its resolve to fight terrorism and eliminate it from Pakistani soil. (full statement)
The statement reflects the dilemma Pakistani government is now facing. In a recent rift with the US, Pakistani civilian and military leaders criticized the scale of American intelligence operations in Pakistan using unmanned aircraft, causing major strains between Washington and Islamabad. The operation in Abbottabad, as reported in the media, has not been consulted with Pakistani authorities, most likely in fear of failure. There, on the other hand, Pakistan is charged with tacit support for terrorist groups awarded by the Pakistani intelligence – ISI and members of the military which is seen as one of the obstacles to a more active engagement in denying safe havens for insurgents. What will happen now is unclear. As the news regarding this special operation unfolds, certainly there will be more questions as to why one of the most known faces in the world managed to survive there for so long. The compound was reportedly eight times bigger than other residences with massive walls topped with barbed wire for protection. It is plausible, that Pakistani leadership for the time being will scale back its criticism for the US operations on its territory in light of its questionable role in all of this. However, recent endeavors to bolster its regional influence in ending the war in Afghanistan involving intense talks with the Afghan government, might in turn be escalated, as the killing of Osama Bin Laden undermines the justification for further US presence in Afghanistan – thereby providing a potential for reinforcing its interests (involving the future of Afghan state, the role of India, and the size of the Afghan army) in forging the endgame for the conflict with its neighbor. The outlook for Islamabad is mixed, and depends on the nature of Pakistan’s support for Bin Laden or the lack there of – factors unknown to the overall public so far. What is clear, the operation will have some impact for the diplomatic dynamics in the region with potential internal consequences for the leadership in Islamabad. Whether Pakistan’s standing should improve or falter is still an open question.
AB
What’s next for Afghanistan?
Source: AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili
David Miliband, former Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, in a recent op-ed piece in International Herald Tribune (Wed April 13th, 2011) outlined his vision for ending the enduring conflict in Afghanistan. His plan’s emphasis lies within a political solution and multilateral efforts, something the allies involved in war so far have failed to achieve. Prior to his visit to MIT to deliver a lecture on Afghanistan, Miliband warns that the allied troops in Afghanistan face the danger of proceeding based on premises of a strategy that although having an end, does not ensure desired ends to war-torn Afghanistan. They key points of Miliband’s plan include:
- Appointment of an international mediator from the Muslim world with a mandate from the U.N. to objectively assess the situation and bring the two sides to the table.
- Providing grounds for negotiation process, i.e. recognition of both sides’ initial demands.
- Establishing tangible, clear boundaries between civilian and military efforts.
- Balanced approach towards Pakistan combining incentives with pressure to engage in resolving Afghan quagmire
- Broadening the base of parties involved in the process through both inviting new states and establishing new cooperative frameworks.
Policymakers and experts agree that 2011 will be an important year for the war in Afghanistan. The beginning of the „fighting season” this year shows relative progress in the most volatile provinces in the south, previously dominated by the Taliban. Nevertheless, the news of better conditions in some areas in Afghanistan is something we’ve heard before, and the transition process is vulnerable to setbacks in face of looming Taliban offensive. David Miliband’s plan reiterates calls on the part of Western officials to turn to political and diplomatic instruments. Emphasis on diplomacy stems from a protracted war effort, resulting in a stalemate that now costs $110 billion each year. Another factor is the increasing number of NATO allies declaring their willingness to withdraw.
Internal Dimension
Gradual steps have been made by the Obama administration in the past year to move on to diplomacy, as the withdrawal of international forces seized to be a distant future. US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke who died in December, pushed for diplomatic solutions involving Pakistan and other regional stakeholders and played a decisive role in facilitating the foundation for such talks. In February, in a speech at the Asia Society, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, rejecting the possibility of preconditions for the talks, subtly introduced US position on how the deal should look like : the Taliban should resort to peaceful means, withdraw support for Al Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution.
Since 2008, administration in Kabul has engaged in efforts to court the Taliban leadership in order to begin the negotiating a settlement, so far to no avail. Afghan administration seems to be ready for serious engagement, in mid-June last year, Karzai established High Peace Council in order to step up reconciliation efforts of former militants. President Hamid Karzai introduced a new proposal to enable the Taliban representatives to establish an office in one of the Muslim countries in order to facilitate efforts for Taliban reconciliation. The initiative was widely seen as a response to calls issued by former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. In December, Karzai visited Turkey to discuss the issue with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Pakistan’s Asi Alif Zardari. Possible spots for the Taliban office include Kabul, Saudi Arabia or Japan, and United Arab Emirates, according to Daily Telegraph which had an interview with former Taliban official. Increased efforts to establish talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are of course a positive notion, for the potential of military action combined with economic assistance begins to reach its peak in terms of unambiguous effects. Nevertheless, accommodation with the Taliban on the grounds and along the lines sketched by Sec. Clinton will be very difficult to achieve.
First, and foremost, the Taliban insurgency, as some might think, is not a united front fighting against the government in Afghanistan. There are at least three major organizations composing the insurgency, with a number of other smaller groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, or other militant groups in neighboring Pakistan. While their war-time objectives seem to converge at the moment, their approach to talks with the government or seizing military activity will likely become increasingly different, with some groups possibly remaining intransigent. The major force – Quetta Shura – led by Mullah Omar – allegedly operating from the city of Quetta in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province seems to be most eager to seek accommodation. Quetta’s operations posed the greatest challenge to the allied efforts in the southern parts of Afghanistan where the group introduced its local administration and courts based on sharia law. However, the reports of Quetta’s rapprochement with the Afghan government are continuously denied by the leadership, and Omar’s appearances, usually on tape do not confirm any willingness on his part to move closer to negotiating table, unless the current government steps down or will be tried in a tribunal for torture. The other major group, the Haqqani network, centered in North Waziristan is said to remain under Mullah Omar’s leadership, but as reports indicate, often operates independently. Last year, the group’s leaders have allegedly participated in talks with Hamid Karzai and Pakistan’s military officials, a rumor denied by Karzai sparked suspicion among the Afghans who fear that the government may try to forge a deal with Pakistan to ensure their interest in the region. The third major group, Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, a long veteran of guerilla war against the Soviet Union is reportedly focused on attaining a share of power in the government, but the group’s position might be subject to changes as Hekmatiar tended to align himself with the most powerful factions in Afghan politics. Other smaller groups include defectors from Afghan Security Forces and local youth fighting fiercely throughout the country with no specific political objectives. In light of the above, the negotiating spectrum as well as eventual agenda is extensive, undermining the chances of substantial compromise. Furthermore, negotiating along the lines drawn by the US administration will be challenging, for the Taliban ranks also include jihadist elements who fight against the state model outlined in the Afghan Constitution and embraced by the government in Kabul.
Another difficulty stems from tactics used by the Afghan government to approach the Taliban, namely lack of transparency. Top government official Mohammad Massoom Stanekzai, Secretary of High Peace Council has publicly confirmed that the talks are on the way, but refused to provide any details short of those that the representatives from both sides have established regular contacts with respective authorities. Given the history of Taliban reign in Afghanistan and their wide repression against members of other minorities, the negotiation process must be transparent and inclusive for a broader range of actors, in order to preclude any possibility of a new civil war waged by other ethnic groups in fear or in dissatisfaction with a negotiated outcome.
Regional Dimension
The geopolitical location of Afghanistan relates to a variety of interests (economic, security, cultural) of neighboring states, therefore their participation in the peace process is inevitable. It is the India-Afghanistan-Pakistan triangle that is viewed as the key to resolving the conflict. Both India and Pakistan value their influence in Afghanistan mainly due to their mutual security concerns and cultural-historic ties. The Pakistani government supports the Taliban and remains reluctant to address the issue of insurgent safe havens, due to their activity in Kashmir. India for its part supports the Northwestern Alliance to balance Pakistani influence. India’s role in Afghanistan has expanded substantially throughout the conflict. New Delhi supported the Afghan government with $1.2 billion mostly on infrastructure projects that bring tangible results, like dams and roads while also focusing on institution building, training public officials and diplomats. Future relationship will be vital for India, as its economy grows, due to access to resources in Central Asian republics, as well as minerals located in Afghanistan. Other important actor – Iran also has a vital interest in the settlement. The conflict has had an impact on Iran, stemming from a large inflow of refugees which Iran had to manage on its own, due to its international isolation. Iran is also interested in curbing the drug traffic bringing disorder and instability to its eastern frontier, as well as maintaining stronger ties with Shia populations among Hazaras and in the region of Herat. Despite Iran’s limited role in post-2001 Afghanistan, the relationship between both countries has a potential to evolve into higher levels because of vibrant trade links between Kabul and Tehran. Tehran will undoubtedly use the eventual multilateral engagement to breakthrough its world-wide isolation and strengthen its influence in the region. Central Asian republics, such as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan view the conflict in similar terms. The drug trafficking and refugees pose a similar threat to the internal stability of those countries. On the other hand, countries like Russia and China, although the latter less so, are concerned predominantly by post 2014 arrangements and the possibility of a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan, if solely for the purpose of training Afghan forces. The Afghan leadership recently disclosed general information pertaining to negotiations over future military involvement of US forces in Afghanistan.
Obviously, the US administration denies such allegations due to sensitivity of talks with the Taliban, and public resentment among the Afghan public, but for Russia, largely supportive of the NATO effort in Afghanistan, protracted US presence will not be acceptable. In terms of China’s involvement, head-on role in the eventual political settlement is not a likely scenario. Nevertheless, China may influence its close partner, Pakistan to energize its involvement in the peace deal.
The above list of obstacles demonstrates how complex the political solution of the war in Afghanistan is, and how much determination will have to be maintained to achieve the positive outcomes Secretary Clinton spoke of. Regardless of the difficulties ahead, the notion of political solution should be further explored and promoted by the countries involved, with more transparency to ensure Afghanistan’s resilience to popular revolts. In the internal context, it is inevitable that both sides – the Taliban and the Afghan government will have to allow for mutual concessions to reach a compromise. In the process, the United States should play an active role to promote governance structures that are adaptable to Afghan traditions, and are consistent with realities on the ground. The current, centralized structure does not fully consider these elements, remains vulnerable to corruption and largely ineffective in providing development, justice and overall management over the country’s diverse populations. If an opportunity arises, the US and other actors should stand behind a solution providing a stable devolution of authority to local governments, with the central administration overseeing security, and retaining control over foreign relations. Current legal framework outlined in the Afghan Constitution which allows such changes to be implemented through legislation, as well as some progress in Afghan governing structures build the ground to move in that direction. The United States however should not be alone in the effort backing the accommodation between the Taliban and the Afghan government, facilitating broader international frameworks to guide the process in a more opened fashion involving all major internal and external stakeholders.
AB
