Brookings on US-China relations
Source: Reuters/Lou Dematteis - Flags of the United States and the People's Republic of China., www.brookings.edu
Brookings analyzes the prospects for and results of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
What’s next for Afghanistan?
Source: AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili
David Miliband, former Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, in a recent op-ed piece in International Herald Tribune (Wed April 13th, 2011) outlined his vision for ending the enduring conflict in Afghanistan. His plan’s emphasis lies within a political solution and multilateral efforts, something the allies involved in war so far have failed to achieve. Prior to his visit to MIT to deliver a lecture on Afghanistan, Miliband warns that the allied troops in Afghanistan face the danger of proceeding based on premises of a strategy that although having an end, does not ensure desired ends to war-torn Afghanistan. They key points of Miliband’s plan include:
- Appointment of an international mediator from the Muslim world with a mandate from the U.N. to objectively assess the situation and bring the two sides to the table.
- Providing grounds for negotiation process, i.e. recognition of both sides’ initial demands.
- Establishing tangible, clear boundaries between civilian and military efforts.
- Balanced approach towards Pakistan combining incentives with pressure to engage in resolving Afghan quagmire
- Broadening the base of parties involved in the process through both inviting new states and establishing new cooperative frameworks.
Policymakers and experts agree that 2011 will be an important year for the war in Afghanistan. The beginning of the „fighting season” this year shows relative progress in the most volatile provinces in the south, previously dominated by the Taliban. Nevertheless, the news of better conditions in some areas in Afghanistan is something we’ve heard before, and the transition process is vulnerable to setbacks in face of looming Taliban offensive. David Miliband’s plan reiterates calls on the part of Western officials to turn to political and diplomatic instruments. Emphasis on diplomacy stems from a protracted war effort, resulting in a stalemate that now costs $110 billion each year. Another factor is the increasing number of NATO allies declaring their willingness to withdraw.
Internal Dimension
Gradual steps have been made by the Obama administration in the past year to move on to diplomacy, as the withdrawal of international forces seized to be a distant future. US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke who died in December, pushed for diplomatic solutions involving Pakistan and other regional stakeholders and played a decisive role in facilitating the foundation for such talks. In February, in a speech at the Asia Society, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, rejecting the possibility of preconditions for the talks, subtly introduced US position on how the deal should look like : the Taliban should resort to peaceful means, withdraw support for Al Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution.
Since 2008, administration in Kabul has engaged in efforts to court the Taliban leadership in order to begin the negotiating a settlement, so far to no avail. Afghan administration seems to be ready for serious engagement, in mid-June last year, Karzai established High Peace Council in order to step up reconciliation efforts of former militants. President Hamid Karzai introduced a new proposal to enable the Taliban representatives to establish an office in one of the Muslim countries in order to facilitate efforts for Taliban reconciliation. The initiative was widely seen as a response to calls issued by former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. In December, Karzai visited Turkey to discuss the issue with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Pakistan’s Asi Alif Zardari. Possible spots for the Taliban office include Kabul, Saudi Arabia or Japan, and United Arab Emirates, according to Daily Telegraph which had an interview with former Taliban official. Increased efforts to establish talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are of course a positive notion, for the potential of military action combined with economic assistance begins to reach its peak in terms of unambiguous effects. Nevertheless, accommodation with the Taliban on the grounds and along the lines sketched by Sec. Clinton will be very difficult to achieve.
First, and foremost, the Taliban insurgency, as some might think, is not a united front fighting against the government in Afghanistan. There are at least three major organizations composing the insurgency, with a number of other smaller groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, or other militant groups in neighboring Pakistan. While their war-time objectives seem to converge at the moment, their approach to talks with the government or seizing military activity will likely become increasingly different, with some groups possibly remaining intransigent. The major force – Quetta Shura – led by Mullah Omar – allegedly operating from the city of Quetta in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province seems to be most eager to seek accommodation. Quetta’s operations posed the greatest challenge to the allied efforts in the southern parts of Afghanistan where the group introduced its local administration and courts based on sharia law. However, the reports of Quetta’s rapprochement with the Afghan government are continuously denied by the leadership, and Omar’s appearances, usually on tape do not confirm any willingness on his part to move closer to negotiating table, unless the current government steps down or will be tried in a tribunal for torture. The other major group, the Haqqani network, centered in North Waziristan is said to remain under Mullah Omar’s leadership, but as reports indicate, often operates independently. Last year, the group’s leaders have allegedly participated in talks with Hamid Karzai and Pakistan’s military officials, a rumor denied by Karzai sparked suspicion among the Afghans who fear that the government may try to forge a deal with Pakistan to ensure their interest in the region. The third major group, Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, a long veteran of guerilla war against the Soviet Union is reportedly focused on attaining a share of power in the government, but the group’s position might be subject to changes as Hekmatiar tended to align himself with the most powerful factions in Afghan politics. Other smaller groups include defectors from Afghan Security Forces and local youth fighting fiercely throughout the country with no specific political objectives. In light of the above, the negotiating spectrum as well as eventual agenda is extensive, undermining the chances of substantial compromise. Furthermore, negotiating along the lines drawn by the US administration will be challenging, for the Taliban ranks also include jihadist elements who fight against the state model outlined in the Afghan Constitution and embraced by the government in Kabul.
Another difficulty stems from tactics used by the Afghan government to approach the Taliban, namely lack of transparency. Top government official Mohammad Massoom Stanekzai, Secretary of High Peace Council has publicly confirmed that the talks are on the way, but refused to provide any details short of those that the representatives from both sides have established regular contacts with respective authorities. Given the history of Taliban reign in Afghanistan and their wide repression against members of other minorities, the negotiation process must be transparent and inclusive for a broader range of actors, in order to preclude any possibility of a new civil war waged by other ethnic groups in fear or in dissatisfaction with a negotiated outcome.
Regional Dimension
The geopolitical location of Afghanistan relates to a variety of interests (economic, security, cultural) of neighboring states, therefore their participation in the peace process is inevitable. It is the India-Afghanistan-Pakistan triangle that is viewed as the key to resolving the conflict. Both India and Pakistan value their influence in Afghanistan mainly due to their mutual security concerns and cultural-historic ties. The Pakistani government supports the Taliban and remains reluctant to address the issue of insurgent safe havens, due to their activity in Kashmir. India for its part supports the Northwestern Alliance to balance Pakistani influence. India’s role in Afghanistan has expanded substantially throughout the conflict. New Delhi supported the Afghan government with $1.2 billion mostly on infrastructure projects that bring tangible results, like dams and roads while also focusing on institution building, training public officials and diplomats. Future relationship will be vital for India, as its economy grows, due to access to resources in Central Asian republics, as well as minerals located in Afghanistan. Other important actor – Iran also has a vital interest in the settlement. The conflict has had an impact on Iran, stemming from a large inflow of refugees which Iran had to manage on its own, due to its international isolation. Iran is also interested in curbing the drug traffic bringing disorder and instability to its eastern frontier, as well as maintaining stronger ties with Shia populations among Hazaras and in the region of Herat. Despite Iran’s limited role in post-2001 Afghanistan, the relationship between both countries has a potential to evolve into higher levels because of vibrant trade links between Kabul and Tehran. Tehran will undoubtedly use the eventual multilateral engagement to breakthrough its world-wide isolation and strengthen its influence in the region. Central Asian republics, such as Tajikistan or Uzbekistan view the conflict in similar terms. The drug trafficking and refugees pose a similar threat to the internal stability of those countries. On the other hand, countries like Russia and China, although the latter less so, are concerned predominantly by post 2014 arrangements and the possibility of a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan, if solely for the purpose of training Afghan forces. The Afghan leadership recently disclosed general information pertaining to negotiations over future military involvement of US forces in Afghanistan.
Obviously, the US administration denies such allegations due to sensitivity of talks with the Taliban, and public resentment among the Afghan public, but for Russia, largely supportive of the NATO effort in Afghanistan, protracted US presence will not be acceptable. In terms of China’s involvement, head-on role in the eventual political settlement is not a likely scenario. Nevertheless, China may influence its close partner, Pakistan to energize its involvement in the peace deal.
The above list of obstacles demonstrates how complex the political solution of the war in Afghanistan is, and how much determination will have to be maintained to achieve the positive outcomes Secretary Clinton spoke of. Regardless of the difficulties ahead, the notion of political solution should be further explored and promoted by the countries involved, with more transparency to ensure Afghanistan’s resilience to popular revolts. In the internal context, it is inevitable that both sides – the Taliban and the Afghan government will have to allow for mutual concessions to reach a compromise. In the process, the United States should play an active role to promote governance structures that are adaptable to Afghan traditions, and are consistent with realities on the ground. The current, centralized structure does not fully consider these elements, remains vulnerable to corruption and largely ineffective in providing development, justice and overall management over the country’s diverse populations. If an opportunity arises, the US and other actors should stand behind a solution providing a stable devolution of authority to local governments, with the central administration overseeing security, and retaining control over foreign relations. Current legal framework outlined in the Afghan Constitution which allows such changes to be implemented through legislation, as well as some progress in Afghan governing structures build the ground to move in that direction. The United States however should not be alone in the effort backing the accommodation between the Taliban and the Afghan government, facilitating broader international frameworks to guide the process in a more opened fashion involving all major internal and external stakeholders.
AB
Questions on the Obama Doctrine
The world’s attention has been recently focused on the upheaval in the Middle East and the American (now allied) response in Libya. What struck me the most was the easiness with which some analysts and commentators have heralded new pathways in the US foreign policy. Yes, I am referring to the so-called Obama Doctrine we’ve been hit by from every possible news outlet in the past few days. It is interesting how easily the term doctrine has been assigned to simply one public statement, considering one particular crisis – Libya, and by the President who throughout his term in office has been anything but doctrinal.
Some might argue here that foreign policy doctrines of the past have also been announced in the same fashion, under somewhat similar circumstances. That is true. Those doctrines, however, tended to be more specific and less flexible in forming the agenda for foreign policy. President Obama in his speech at the National Defense University (serving as an explanation to the American people as to why the administration decided to act) merely repeated the code of conduct inherent in policies of past administrations – that the US will act militarily only in cases where the American values and national interests are at stake. This very premise stood behind most actions undertaken by American presidents since the end World War II, whether it was Eisenhower, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton or G.W Bush. Another point the President made was that the US will seek coalitions to defend those interests and avoid unilateral engagement. Careful observer of global politics during the past decade will be able to provide examples of similar positions in American administrations. The National Security Strategy, outlines the concept of multilateral action to confront the international crises with active participation of allies and partners through, either established international institutions, or informal global governance structures. The concept of multilateralism and burden-sharing has been set aside by two G.W. Bush administrations, but that fact does not make Obama’s posture significantly new, rather depicting Bush as a doctrinal aberration, or a distortion, if you will, of the established foreign policy practices. The so-called Obama doctrine, therefore, does not provide anything substantially new, and as far as names are concerned, we might as well call it the Business-As-Usual, Reagan, Clinton or Carter doctrine II, for the latter had a concept of his own.
Extent and flexibility is another matter. Even if we call Obama’s justification to intervention in Libya a doctrine, is it possible to maintain that the military measures be applied to, say, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Yemen – all important allies in the region? Is it politically and logistically feasible for the United States to engage in military intervention, even in a coalition, in countries with complex internal circumstances that are difficult to assess ? The list of eventual scenarios and entities subject to military action is long, for the US remains a global power with interests in every corner of the world. The Obama doctrine, as it is currently understood by the pundits is too extensive. Policy implementation would therefore require additional considerations, short of those provided by President Obama in his speech, which actually precludes any reason to call those pronouncements a doctrine in the first place. On the other hand, it is regrettable that this catch phrase has been coined as the upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa begins to unfold. The speech has a profound significance to many allies and partners in the region, and it might send a wrong message, not to mention the possible domestic impact for the President seeking his second term. Further responses to crises inevitably different from the one in Libya may become subject to domestic, as well as international scrutiny on doctrinal consistency and coherence with his statement at the National Defense University, in consequence putting him under pressure facing 2012.
Lastly, Obama’s policies, both foreign and domestic have been anything but doctrinal. Obama’s decisions, the surge in Afghanistan, or his overall view of military action, refusal to close Guantanamo, healthcare reform, or recent concessions he made to Republicans in Congress on fiscal issues all show that the guiding principle behind his policies is pragmatism. Obama acts where and when it is possible, with carefully established goals circumscribed by feasibility of his eventual actions. Critics even argue that he fails to show leadership on any given issue on the agenda. Disappointment on the part of some progressive circles caused by his failure to deliver on key campaign promises speaks for itself. He could not deliver, for the middle ground is where he feels the most comfortable. Perhaps this element could somehow distinguish him from other chief executives. However we might view Obama’s White House, I think it is fair to say that the media reaction to this speech was both premature and untimely. A doctrinal concept characterizing this President’s policies is yet to emerge.
AB
