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Przysłuchując się debatom dotyczącym polityki zagranicznej Baracka Obamy można odnieść wrażenie, że tak naprawdę, widoczne w niej podziały można zredukować do odwiecznego pytania o w połowie pełną lub w połowie pustą szklankę. Problemem jest to, iż rzadko kiedy mówi się, że po prostu jest w niej woda.

Stephen Walt w ostatnim artykule na stronach magazynu Foreign Policy w zasadzie podsumował argumenty zwolenników jednej ze stron – szklanka jest raczej w połowie pusta. Walt podobnie jak republikanie uznaje, że pomimo sukcesów, jak obalenie Kadafiego, unicestwienie Osamy Bin Ladena, czy poprawy wizerunku Stanów Zjednoczonych na arenie międzynarodowej, istnieje szereg obszarów, w których polityka zagraniczna Obamy nie okazała się sukcesem, by nie powiedzieć,  że była porażką. Od problemów polityki klimatycznej po relacje z Pakistanem, Walt wskazuje, iż większość wyborczych obietnic Obamy w polityce zagranicznej nie została zrealizowana.

Questions on the Obama Doctrine

The world’s attention has been recently focused on the upheaval in the Middle East and the American (now allied) response in Libya. What struck me the most was the easiness with which some analysts and commentators have heralded new pathways in the US foreign policy. Yes, I am referring to the so-called Obama Doctrine we’ve been hit by from every possible news outlet in the past few days. It is interesting how easily the term doctrine has been assigned to simply one public statement, considering one particular crisis – Libya, and by the President who throughout his term in office has been anything but doctrinal.

Some might argue here that foreign policy doctrines of the past have also been announced in the same fashion, under somewhat similar circumstances. That is true. Those doctrines, however, tended to be more specific and less flexible in forming the agenda for foreign policy. President Obama in his speech at the National Defense University (serving as an explanation to the American people as to why the administration decided to act) merely repeated the code of conduct inherent in policies of past administrations – that the US will act militarily only in cases where the American values and national interests are at stake. This very premise stood behind most actions undertaken by American presidents since the end World War II, whether it was Eisenhower, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton or G.W Bush. Another point the President made was that the US will seek coalitions to defend those interests and avoid unilateral engagement. Careful observer of global politics during the past decade will be able to provide examples of similar positions in   American administrations. The National Security Strategy, outlines the concept of multilateral action to confront the international crises with active participation of allies and partners through, either established international institutions, or informal global governance structures. The concept of multilateralism and burden-sharing has been set aside by two G.W. Bush administrations, but that fact does not make Obama’s posture significantly new, rather depicting Bush as a doctrinal aberration, or a distortion, if you will, of the established foreign policy practices. The so-called Obama doctrine, therefore, does not provide anything substantially new, and as far as names are concerned, we might as well call it the Business-As-Usual, Reagan, Clinton or Carter doctrine II, for the latter had a concept of his own.

Extent and flexibility is another matter. Even if we call Obama’s justification to intervention in Libya a doctrine, is it possible to maintain that the military measures be applied to, say, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Yemen – all important allies in the region? Is it politically and logistically feasible for the United States to engage in military intervention, even in a coalition, in countries with complex internal circumstances that are difficult to assess ? The list of eventual scenarios and entities subject to military action is long, for the US remains a global power with interests in every corner of the world. The Obama doctrine, as it is currently understood by the pundits is too extensive. Policy implementation would therefore require additional considerations, short of those provided by President Obama in his speech, which actually precludes any reason to call those pronouncements a doctrine in the first place. On the other hand, it is regrettable that this catch phrase has been coined as the upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa begins to unfold. The speech has a profound significance to many allies and partners in the region, and it might send a wrong message, not to mention the possible domestic impact for the President seeking his second term. Further responses to crises inevitably different from the one in Libya may become subject to domestic, as well as international scrutiny on doctrinal consistency and coherence with his statement at the National Defense University, in consequence putting him under pressure facing 2012.

Lastly, Obama’s policies, both foreign and domestic have been anything but doctrinal. Obama’s decisions, the surge in Afghanistan, or his overall view of military action, refusal to close Guantanamo, healthcare reform, or recent concessions he made to Republicans in Congress on fiscal issues all show that the guiding principle behind his policies is pragmatism. Obama acts where and when it is possible, with carefully established goals circumscribed by feasibility of his eventual actions. Critics even argue that he fails to show leadership on any given issue on the agenda. Disappointment on the part of some progressive circles caused by his failure to deliver on key campaign promises speaks for itself. He could not deliver, for the middle ground is where he feels the most comfortable. Perhaps this element could somehow distinguish him from other chief executives. However we might view Obama’s White House, I think it is fair to say that the media reaction to this speech was both premature and untimely. A doctrinal concept characterizing this President’s policies is yet to emerge.

AB